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An understanding of the causes behind the development of authoritarian government 
in Germany in the late 1920s and the 1930s, and the collapse of democracy during that 
period, is integral to any study of twentieth-century German history. The President’s use of 
the wide-ranging executive powers which were granted to him by the Weimar Constitution is 
generally recognised as one of those causes, and analysis as to why the Constitution defined 
the Presidency as it did is central to any investigation of the downward trajectory of 
democratic government during the Weimar Republic.  The extensive literature on this issue 
generally posits that the predominantly liberal drafters – the most influential of whom were 
associated with the German Democratic Party – did not realise in 1919 the difficulties 
inherent in the granting of the presidential powers which are recognised by scholars in the 
field today. This thesis re-examines that understanding and argues the need for a more 
differentiated and more nuanced approach. With particular reference to primary source 
material – specifically the relevant debates of the National Assembly as well as the 
contemporary writings of Hugo Preuß and Max Weber – the thesis suggests that the liberal 
drafters understood the potential for abuse of the provisions regarding the President’s 
executive powers, and indeed that it is possible they may have desired some form of semi-
authoritarian outcome. These conclusions have implications, not only for historical 
understandings of the causes which contributed to the rise of authoritarian government in 
Germany in the late Weimar Republic, but also for the drafters of the Constitutions of 




Der Historiker ist ein rückwärts gekehrter Prophet. 
Friedrich von Schlegel 
 
As Karl Dietrich Bracher has pointed out, any analysis of the interwar years in 
Germany which begins with the understanding that the fate of the Weimar Republic was 
“bereits für entschieden anzusehen” and that the failure of the Republic was a 
“zwangsläufige, unausweichliche Konsequenz”1 of the history of the German people up until 
that date is itself destined to be inherently flawed, as such an analysis views historical events 
deterministically. Similarly, Erich Matthias has noted:  
Any attempt to give a monocausal interpretation of the fate of the Republic is bound to 
fail when put to any serious test [. . .]. If we are to understand what happened in 
Germany we must start from the premise that the erosion and ultimate doom of the 
Republic were due to the interaction of a variety of factors.2 
                                                     







Nevertheless, the role played by the wide-ranging powers of the President as defined under 
the Constitution in the deterioration of democratic governance in Weimar Germany cannot be 
discounted. This is not to say that the Constitution was the only, or even the most important, 
factor in the history of the period which caused that outcome and its horrific consequences. 
But given the significance of the President and the powers granted to him in precipitating that 
“ultimate doom”, examining the declared aims and expectations of the drafters of the 
Constitution in defining the role of President as they did seems central to any interpretation of 
twentieth-century German history, and also has contemporary relevance, given the number of 
emerging democracies on the geo-political scene following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, 
and more recently in the Middle East. This thesis will argue the need for a differentiated view 
of the intentions of those who drafted the new German Constitution in 1919, with particular 
reference to primary source material.  
The Weimar Constitution was composed after the end of the First World War, in a period of 
national unrest and civil disorder. The new democratic system was formed within the 
democratically elected forum of the Nationalversammlung,3 which had been established in 
the midst of the Versailles peace negotiations. The contemporary political party with the 
greatest influence on the constitutional drafting process was the Deutsche Demokratische 
Partei, the newly created political home of German Liberalism founded in November of 1918 
by the merger of the Fortschrittliche Partei and the left wing of the Nationalliberale Partei.4 







One of the co-founders of this party – Hugo Preuß, “father of the Weimar Constitution”5 – 
drafted the initial constitutional document, and it was the ideas of the German liberal 
bourgeoisie, as extolled most passionately by another famous DDP co-founder, Max Weber, 
which predominantly found expression in the final document.  As well as having a profound 
influence on the initial draft, the DDP was also given the Chairmanship, in the person of 
Conrad Haußmann, of the Verfassungsausschuß of the National Assembly (a position to 
which it was not automatically entitled by the party-political makeup of the Assembly), and 
Preuß was made Reichsminister des Innern, propounding the government line in the debates. 
His standing was such that he even continued in this role – though with the amended title of 
Reichskommissar für Verfassungsfragen – after he resigned from the government along with 
the rest of his DDP colleagues in June 1919 rather than be party to the official ratification of 
the Treaty of Versailles and the imposition of the punitive measures mandated by the same.  
One aspect of the Constitution which had significant repercussions for the stability of the 
democratic process during the Weimar Republic was the creation of a powerful Presidency. 
With the drafters conceiving the President as a counterbalance to the Parliament, he was 
given wide-ranging powers including the ability to appoint and dismiss the Chancellor and 
his Ministry, to dissolve the Parliament and, perhaps most decisively, the prerogative to take 
executive action in the face of threats or disturbances to the “öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung” per Article 48 of the Constitution.6 Over the course of the turbulent political and 
                                                     
5 Herbert Kraus, The Crisis of German Democracy (Princeton: 1932), p.159.  
6“Die  Weimarer  Verfassung”,  Deutsches  Historisches  Museum  Online,  29  September  2010 
(http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/weimar/verfassung/index.html). This and all subsequent quotations from the 




economic history of the Weimar Republic, a paradigm developed in which the Parliament 
became ineffective as a legislative body: it proved incapable of forming stable, long-term 
governments, and the President began to play an ever-increasing role in the passing of 
legislation. From 1930 onwards, government measures were increasingly instituted by 
decree, using the power vested in the President by Article 48. Of itself the Article was not 
inherently anti-democratic, technically containing various checks on its use, despite its 
widely-drafted provisions. But in the face of the other powers granted to the President, these 
checks were nullified and the President was able to exercise power in an almost completely 
unchallenged manner.  
The position of the President has been analysed at length in the scholarly literature, and this 
body of work generally asserts (though not without exception) that the drafters of 1919 did 
not intend any of the authoritarian outcomes which arose partly as a result of the freedom 
with which the President could exercise the powers they had granted him in the Constitution, 
and did not realise the authoritarian potential inherent in the President’s powers. The analysis 
provided by individual authors claims, for example, that, “[t]he possibility that the 
constitutional system could be destroyed by manipulation of the democratic process never 
occurred to the members of the National Assembly.”7 This is despite the problems inherent in 
the role of the President and his ability to employ his powers under Article 48 without 
effective oversight being described, for example, as, “an obvious weakness.”8  
                                                     
7 Hans Mommsen, The Rise and  Fall of Weimar Democracy,  translated by Elborg  Forster  and  Larry Eugene 






This thesis will challenge this view of the drafters’ intentions by examining primary source 
documents in an effort to ascertain what central figures involved in the process thought at the 
time the Constitution was being drafted. This will be done in order to avoid reaching an 
unjustified conclusion with regard to their intentions simply by presuming they could not 
have desired the post-1933 outcomes which arose partly as a result of the way in which they 
had constructed the Constitution in 1919. However, the thesis is not intended to discount the 
scholarship already compiled on the subject, but rather to align with a minority view which 
seems more justifiable in the face of the primary evidence, and to suggest that a more 
differentiated view of the drafters’ intentions ought to be developed.  
The first chapter of the thesis outlines the genesis, scope and significance of the presidential 
powers by examining a number of themes in turn. The first theme examined is the creation of 
the Weimar Constitution as a document, with an exposition of the events which both 
preceded and precipitated its development, as well as of the drafting process itself. The 
second section of the first chapter deals with the drafters themselves, specifically the groups 
and individuals who were most influential in 1919, namely the DDP and its members. The 
final section of the first chapter outlines the powers granted to the President in the 
Constitution, and explains where they led in historical terms.  
The second chapter begins with a literature review which details the trends within the existing 
scholarship on the powers of the President in the Weimar Constitution, and which sets out the 
current understanding as to the conceptions of the Presidency which were held by the drafters 
of 1919. This is followed by a critical analysis of these views, with direct reference to 
primary source materials such as the proceedings of the National Assembly and the 
contemporary writings of Hugo Preuß and Max Weber, which is intended to support the 
argument that a more nuanced view of the drafters’ aims in so establishing the role of the 
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President would be more appropriate. The methodology of the thesis is thus straightforward, 
in that it assesses the existing historical understanding against the evidence provided by 
relevant primary sources. The thesis ends with a brief summation of the conclusions drawn 

















Sie streiten sich, so heißts, um Freiheitsrechte: 
Genau besehn, sinds Knechte gegen Knechte. 
Faust II, 6962f. / Mephistopheles 
 
The Creation of the Weimar Constitution 
Before any analysis of the effects of the Articles in the Weimar Constitution defining 
the President’s powers can be undertaken, it is necessary to outline the processes which 
brought about the implementation of the new German constitutional structure. A mere five 
days after the proclamation of the Republic on 9 November 1918, and amidst the events of 
the German ‘Revolution’, Friedrich Ebert – in his role as Vorsitzender des Rates der 
Volksbeauftragten – invited Hugo Preuß to draft a Constitution which would comprise the 
basis of the discussions as to the new form of the German State. It would seem to be no 
coincidence that Preuß received this offer on the same day, 14 November, that he had 
published an article in the Berliner Tageblatt entitled, “Volksstaat oder verkehrter 
Obrigkeitsstaat?”9, which set out his vision of a democratic Germany. The advisability of 
having a draft Constitution before the National Assembly – or any other similar body – was 
established to discuss new constitutional arrangements is ably set out, if in a slightly tongue-
in-cheek manner, by Ernest Hamburger: 





The availability of an appropriate text as a basis for negotiations is important in 
preventing the discussion from drifting aimlessly. To ensure purposeful debate and 
rapid decisions, a gathering needs a firm platform from which to advance. This may not 
necessarily apply to all peoples, but it certainly does to the Germans.10 
Having already published his ideas along with a completed constitutional draft in 1917 in an 
article entitled “Vorschläge zur Abänderung der Reichsverfassung und der preußischen 
Verfassung nebst Begründung”,11 Preuß was able to compose the document requested by 
Ebert with remarkable speed, and in order to further develop this draft an informal 
Constitutional Committee was set up at his suggestion,12 meeting from 9 to 12 December 
1918. Interestingly, it was not exclusively politicians of the day who made up this thirteen-
man committee, but also various officials from the civil service, including Paul von Krause, 
who had been Staatssekretär des Reichsjustizamtes im Deutschen Kaiserreich since 1876; 
Kurt Riegler, as representative for the Foreign Office; Theodor Lewald, the 
Unterstaatssekretär im Reichsamt des Innern; and Geheimrat Schulze as a further 
representative from the Reichsamt des Innern. This inclusion of imperial State bureaucrats in 
the composition of the future democratic basis for the German State did not excite any 
comment at the time: as Hans Mommsen points out, “No one took umbrage at the 
involvement of high-ranking officials from the national and state governments in the work of 
                                                     







the constitutional committee.”13 In any case, the dominance of the DDP and contemporary 
liberal ideals remained the hallmark of these discussions, not only because several of the 
bureaucrats themselves had close ties to the DDP, but also due to the influence of Preuß and 
Max Weber on the committee and during the debates undertaken. The important role played 
by this preliminary committee in the drafting process as a whole is summed up well by 
Gerhard Schulz, who describes the Committee as 
the delivery room of the Weimar Constitution, although it had no official character, met 
with strict secrecy, and did not allow decisions by vote. Its decisions established the 
fundamental framework of the Weimar constitution that remained essentially 
unchanged in the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary deliberations that were to 
follow.14  
The day after the election of the National Assembly on 19 January 1919, the Committee’s 
draft was published in the Amtlichen Reichsanzeiger. The Assembly’s first reading of the 
Constitution was undertaken on 21 February, and a general debate in which the various 
parties outlined their positions towards the draft followed until 4 March. After the debates 
within the plenary sessions of the Assembly, “[d]ie weitere Behandlung des Entwurfs wurde 
dann einem Verfassungsausschuß aus 28 Abgeordneten aller Parteien unter Vorsitz des 








württembergischen Demokraten Haußmann anvertraut.”15 This Committee was given the 
weighty title of Ausschuß zur Vorberatung des Entwurfs einer Verfassung des Deutschen 
Reichs. The relative speed of these events was likely due to the imperative nature of the 
Versailles peace negotiations which were then taking place: “Der Druck der Versailler 
Verhandlungen hat schließlich wesentlich zur Beschleunigung der Schlußberatungen im 
Ausschuß wie im Plenum beigetragen.”16 The hopes that the democratization of Germany 
taking place in the National Assembly could be used as a positive bargaining tool during the 
peace negotiations were quashed on 7 May, when the harsh peace conditions were finally 
given to the Germans by the Allies.  
Meanwhile the debates on the Constitution continued. Once the official Constitutional 
Committee had completed its work, the draft was further debated in plenary sessions until the 
conclusion of the second reading on 22 July, with the third reading following on 29 July and 
the final vote taking place on 31 July 1919. The final document did not meet with universal 
acclamation, being approved by 262 votes to 75, with the DNVP and DVP as well as the 
Bayerische Bauern-Bund and USPD members voting against the Constitution, as was only to 
be expected given their attitude towards the changes being made to the German State 
structure throughout the proceedings. However, the parties which made up the governing 
‘Weimar Coalition’ – MSPD, DDP and the German Centre Party – were also unable to 
muster unanimous support for the Constitution: “auch von den Koalitionsparteien fehlten 
etwa 70 Abgeordnete; der rasche Schwund der breiten Koalitionsmehrheit zeichnete sich hier 





schon ab.”17 Further, those reactionary forces opposed to the democratic system within 
Germany were already employing the slurs which would come to be used with ever-
increasing frequency towards the end of the Republic’s life. Oswald Spengler, for instance, 
saw the assembled representatives not as the best and brightest that the nation could produce 
at this time of critical change, but, on the contrary, described the National Assembly as a, 
“Biertisch höherer Ordnung.”18 Criticisms of both the democratic process and the 

















The Drafters of the Weimar Constitution 
The role played by the DDP in composing the constitutional document was decisively 
significant. It was the “Doppelkonstruktion”19 of the liberal drafters – influenced by the 
theories of Robert Redslob and the idea that the President was to be a ‘counterweight’ to 
Parliament, with the two bodies supposedly balancing one another out, and conceived in 
response to the skepticism of parliamentary supremacy which was propounded forcefully by 
Max Weber in the intellectual milieux of the liberals outside the Assembly – which was most 
conclusively adapted into the Constitution, and it was the intellectuals of the DDP who 
played the most influential roles in both the unofficial and official Constitutional 
Committees, as well as in the plenary sessions of the National Assembly. During the debates 
of the Verfassungsausschuß  and the National Assembly, the floor was necessarily given over 
to Preuß in his role as Reichsminister des Innern and later as Reichskommissar für 
Verfassungsfragen, to respond to suggested amendments and to complaints by other members 
against the form of the draft Constitution, and the position advocated by him regarding 
questions on the President and his powers was almost always that accepted in the final vote. 
Similarly, the positions taken by the DDP as a party in that regard often met with the 
approval of the other parties present, with the exception of the USPD and occasionally the 
MSPD, the members of which seem to have been the only representatives within the National 
Assembly who saw anything problematical in the propositions put forward by the DDP. 20   





formulation, see Eduard Heilfron  (ed.), Die Deutsche Nationalversammlung  im  Jahre 1919  in  ihrer Arbeit  für 
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Whether the choice of the MSPD leadership to allow the DDP the critical role of Chairman in 
the Verfassungsausschuß (which by order of numerical superiority should have been held by 
the Majority Socialists) can be viewed as a further instance of the “abdication of 
parliamentary responsibility”21 – an accusation leveled against the MSPD leadership by 
various scholars with regard to their behaviour during most of the fourteen years of the 
Weimar Republic – or whether these leaders genuinely saw the primacy of the liberals and 
their conceptions of the State as most conducive to the best outcome, is not critical to this 
analysis. What this choice does indicate, however, is the pervasive influence of the DDP and 
its members, and consequently their ideas, during the drafting process.  
The level of influence the DDP exerted was truly remarkable given their relatively modest 
representation among the members of the National Assembly, especially in comparison with 
other parties – particularly the MSPD – which could otherwise have been expected to have 
been guiding and controlling forces within the debates, due to their representative superiority: 
The German Democratic Party ranked only third in terms of party strength in Weimar, 
but played an important role in the constitution-making out of proportion to its 
members. Preuß had prepared the text and presented it to the Assembly. Konrad [sic] 
Haußmann was elected Chairman of the Constitutional Committee. Friedrich Naumann, 








the Party Chairman, was remarkable in that generally rather sober minded Assembly 
for the pathos with which he proclaimed national and democratic ideals.22 
The reason it was the members of the DDP who were chosen to formulate the Constitution 
despite their numerical inferiority within the Assembly and their modest position within the 
Government was apparently the experience of their party members in that regard. The 
conclusion reached by Hamburger is that the Socialists had neither the expertise nor the 
inclination to involve themselves too heavily in the minutiae of the drafting process, which 
seems justified despite the generalised and somewhat overstated nature of its expression: “As 
in other fields, the Social Democrats lacked suitable personnel. Socialist lawyers had hardly 
ever paid attention to constitutional and administrative matters.”23  
The two members of the DDP who most shaped the drafting of the Constitution were both 
widely respected figures in the field of Constitutional Law, and had previously published on 
the subject of a new Constitution for the German State, with their cumulative influence on the 
ideas held within the DDP, particularly with regard to Weber’s and Preuß’s extensive 
influence throughout in the drafting process, being the culmination of many years of 
academic work. Preuß had studied law, completing a doctorate at the University of Göttingen 
in 1883, had worked since 1889 at the Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität zu Berlin as an 
untenured lecturer in Public Law, had been made rector of the Handelshochschule Berlin in 
1918 and had published widely within legal circles. Weber, after also completing a doctorate 
in law at the Universität zu Berlin, held various prestigious academic posts and published 
widely in numerous academic and political fields – including law, sociology and economics.  





While the gravitas which their various positions and accolades accorded them may not have 
been reflected in the opinions of many of their own Party colleagues – with Preuß regularly 
seeking and regularly being rejected from pre-selection for the party lists in winnable seats, 
and Weber describing his opponents within the left-liberal DDP as “doctrinaire pacifists and 
literati”24– their importance to German legal and social thought at the time meant that they 
were both considered for the role of Statssekretär des Reichsinnenministeriums, with the task 
finally falling to Preuß, largely due to the uncertain feelings Ebert had towards Weber: 
[Ebert] preferred the expert with a solid knowledge of constitutional law, who 
moreover had carried out some relevant preliminary work, to the sociologist of genius 
who was more deeply interested in social affairs, while his attitude during the war had 
not always inspired confidence and his decisions were sometimes unpredictable.25 
The “relevant preliminary work” referred to was primarily the publication of Preuß’s 1917 
pamphlet (see above p.8). In this, Preuß had set out his ideal version of a new German 
Constitution, including a powerful President as a balancing factor vis-à-vis the hypothetical 
Parliament. Weber had also published a draft of a “plebiscitary führer democracy”26 – in 
which a popularly and directly elected leader was the ultimate manifestation of government – 
in 1917 in a series of articles entitled “Deutschlands Parlamentarismus in Vergangenheit und 
                                                     







Zukunft”, but due to the aforementioned reservations about his character he was not a 
favoured candidate for any official role.  
Despite his lack of official status, such was Weber’s skill in debate that he often managed to 
convince the other members of the unofficial Constitutional Committee to accede to his point 
of view: “the Reich constitution is complete in principle and very close to my proposals”27 
[his emphasis]. The final draft produced by that Committee, described by Karl Löwenstein as 
“Preuß’s draft”, “accorded very wide powers to the Reichspräsident, largely as a result of 
Max Weber’s pressing demands.”28  It was largely Weber’s idea that the President should be 
a great “caesarean leader”29, a man who most fully expressed the Weberian ideal of the ethic 
of Responsibility and ethic of Conviction in politics, as put forward in Weber’s oft-cited 
speech to students at Munich University, Politik als Beruf,30 and a man who could carry the 
people of a nation into acceptance and pursuit of his ideas through force of personality. In 
arguing for such, Weber was simply pursuing an augmentation of the powers already granted 
by Preuß to the President in his original provisional constitutional draft of 1918, which were 
ultimately an expression of the liberal philosophy of the State which was enunciated by the 
DDP as a political party. The Wiesbadener Zeitung of 6 December 1918, for example, cited 










Weber’s comment during a speech made in the same town that, “Parlamentarism and with it 
partisan quarrels are avoidable if the unified executive of the Reich is in the hands of a 
President elected by the entire nation.”31 Similarly, the Heidelberger Tageblatt of 17 January 
1919 reported Weber’s comments during a Collegial Cabinet speech regarding the “classical 
model” of parliamentary democracy:  
We are supporters of a strong governmental power on a democratic basis and 
supporters of a president directly elected by the people. We would experience a stupid 
shopkeepers’ convention or the like if we had a college of ministers without the power 
of the president above it. This might produce, for example, a minister of culture from 
the Centre, a Socialist finance minister, etc.32 
Friedrich Meinecke, the lauded historian and another DDP co-founder, was particularly 
vehement in advocating the development of an Ersatzkaiser position for the President in 
articles published in late 1918 and early 1919, which included this profession of belief: “Ich 
bleibe, der Vergangenheit zugewandt, Herzensmonarchist und werde, der Zukunft 
zugewandt, Vernuftrepublikaner.”33 Similarly, Friedrich Naumann, the first Vorsitzender of 
the DDP and member of the official Constitutional Committee, believed that a powerful 
President who embodied and appointed the whole executive was desirable and, “that the 
American presidential system was a better model.”34 Bruno Ablass, a further member of the 
                                                     
31 Cited in Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber, p.340. Weber is cited as translated by Michael S. Steinberg.  
32 Ibid. 





DDP included in the official Constitutional Committee, declared his views – which reflected 
those of the wider political Party – to the Committee room in a remakably succinct manner, 
“I am an enemy of an absolutely unlimited parliamentary majority.”35  
Through these and the preceding comments it can be suggested, without placing an undue 
emphasis on individual paragraphs or phrases, that the ideal governmental model of the 
liberal drafters of the Constitution was one which, in many ways, was an authoritarian model 
of democracy.  The fact that these conceptions were widespread among the group which had 
the most influence on the construction of the Constitution as a whole – and specifically on the 
powers of the President – had a deleterious effect upon the workability of government in 









                                                     





The Significance of the Presidential Powers 
Those Articles which detailed the powers of the President had an importance which it 
would be difficult to overstate. Brecht has suggested: 
It is not too much to say that, if [these clauses] had not been written into the 
Constitution, the history of Germany would have taken a very different course, 
although it may be impossible to say exactly what that would have been.36 
It was through those powers that the authoritarian trends in the many and varied governments 
of the Weimar period were able to develop: trends which precipitated the downward 
trajectory of truly democratic government in Germany.  
Article 48 empowered the President to pass executive measures and use military force in 
cases, “wenn im Deutschen Reich die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung erheblich gestört 
oder gefährdet [wurde]” – a situation described parenthetically by Peter L. Lindseth as “all 
too common under the Weimar Republic as it turned out.”37 As Boldt has pointed out, Article 
48 of the Weimar Constitution is, “[i]n die Tradition des Belagerungszustandes [. . .] 
einzuordnen”,38 and it emulated provisions in previous German Constitutions which allowed 
a besonderer Rechtszustand to be declared when a state of affairs was thought to exist which 
                                                     
36 Arnold Brecht, Prelude to Silence: the End of the German Republic (New York, NY: 1944), p.49.  







endangered the safety and order of the State, for example Article 68 of the Reichsverfassung 
of 1871.  
The measures to be taken under Article 48 were intended to facilitate the, “Wiederherstellung 
der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung.” To this end the President could suspend “ganz 
oder zum Teil” various individual liberties enumerated in the Constitution, including freedom 
of the person; inviolability of the home; right to privacy of letter, telegram and telephone 
communication; freedom of opinion and the press; freedom of assembly and the right to form 
associative groups, as enumerated in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123 and 124 respectively. 
These measures, as with all other Presidential actions, required the countersignature of either 
the Chancellor or the relevant Minister, per Article 50, and the President was required to 
inform the Parliament immediately of any measures taken under Article 48, with the 
Parliament then having the power to demand their suspension. But all his powers combined 
made the President far more effective in any conflict of his will with that of Parliament: he 
could simply nullify the Parliament’s control over his measures taken under Article 48, “by 
continual use of his authority to dissolve that body.”39 Article 25 of the Weimar Constitution 
granted the President the power to dissolve the Parliament. It was a very wide power which 
was constrained only by the “vague condition”40 that this only could be done, “einmal aus 
dem gleichen Anlass”. The same Article mandated that new elections take place within sixty 
days after the Parliament had been dissolved, a provision which would seem unremarkable. 
But as Brecht noted in 1944, the period of time the Parliament could remain dissolved before 
new elections had to be held was “a long time under modern conditions and [could] easily be 





used so as to make any immediate re-establishment of a fully democratic government 
technically and practically impossible.”41 Article 53 of the Weimar Constitution granted the 
President the power to appoint and dismiss the Chancellor and Cabinet. While this is not 
problematical in and of itself, when combined with his other powers, this Article meant that 
the President 
could ensure a cabinet which would give him the requisite countersignature and which 
did not have the confidence of parliament simply because there was for the time being 
no parliament in existence.42 
The President was granted another constitutionally embedded advantage over his rival or 
counterweight – depending on the preferred interpretation – the Parliament by the drafters of 
1919: his term of office was seven years, per Article 43, while that of the Reichstag was only 
four, as set out in Article 23. This construction had unfortunate consequences for the long-
term viability of the Republic, as the establishment of a centralised figure of authority had an 
adverse effect on the behaviour of the political parties within the Parliament itself:  
Die Regierung ohne oder gegen das Parlament mochte als Konsequenz erscheinen, 
wenn die siebenjährige Amtsperiode des Reichspräsidenten als Faktor der Kontinuität 
gegenüber dem natürlichen Pluralismus und Antagonismus der Parteien und Fraktionen 
überlegen machte. Der Zwang zur Kooperation und Koalition, jenes Lebenselement der 
parlamentarischen Demokratie, verlor damit an verpflichtender Kraft, Parlament und 





Parteien mochten sich an die Haltung unfruchtbarer Opposition oder resignierender 
Tolerierung gewöhnen.43 
The power of the President was such that he could be used as a last resort, a fallback, in cases 
of legislative or political deadlock, which meant that the parties in the Parliament did not 
always shrink from allowing coalitions to collapse, and governments to be denied stability for 
reasons of political expediency. These structural problems within the polity led to 
governmental instability of a chronic nature: “The average life of a government during 
Weimar was eight months.”44  As Bracher says, the Doppelkonstruktion of the liberals 
sollte die schwerwiegende Konsequenz zur Folge haben, dass das Weimarer 
Regierungssystem ein dualistisches Gebilde, eine Mischform von präsidialer und 
parlamentarischer Demokratie, war; statt einander zu stützen und zu stärken, haben die 
beiden Prinzipien sich im weiteren Verlauf eher behindert und schließlich vernichtet.45 
With the onset of the financial and social crises precipitated by the Wall Street Crash in 1929, 
these structural problems within the government contributed significantly to the destruction 
of the entire system in favour of an authoritarian regime. The extent to which the presidential 
powers influenced these events is best shown by an examination of how President 
Hindenburg used those powers during the economic crisis. It has been claimed that 
Hindenburg 







read the constitution of the republic for the first time when he became President and 
that he then underlined all passages concerning the rights of parliament with a red 
pencil and the passages concerning the authority of the President with a blue one. It 
was in this fashion that Hindenburg understood his role as President.46 
This understanding of the Constitution was, to an extent, the very one the liberal drafters of 
the document held in 1919; perceiving the two equally legitimate and popularly-elected 
political representatives – President and Parliament – as combative organs of government 
designed to check one another. Unfortunately, the economic crisis which gripped Germany 
from 1929 and the measures taken by the conservative government of Heinrich Brüning 
brought about a drastic change in the way the government was run and the manner in which 
legislative measures were passed. Brüning had made it clear from the beginning of his 
government that he would use Article 48 to pass his economic ‘reforms’ if the Parliament 
should oppose them; a not entirely novel approach, given that President Ebert had passed 
economic measures in the same way in the early 1920s.47 This tactic was initially successful 
in ensuring parliamentary compliance with Brüning’s measures, but in July 1930 his main 
financial bill was rejected and he resorted to Article 48 to pass cuts to expenditure and 
increases in tax. The SPD48 moved a motion to suspend the decree – which they were entitled 
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to do, per Article 48 of the Constitution – and it was passed by a four-vote majority. President 
Hindenburg then issued the following decree on 18 July 1930: 
Nachdem der Reichstag heute beschlossen hat, zu verlangen, dass meine auf Grund des 
Artikels 48 der Reichsverfassung erlassenen Verordnungen vom 16. Juli außer Kraft 
gesetzt werden, löse ich auf Grund von Artikel 25 der Reichsverfassung den Reichstag 
auf.49 
Once the hindering function of the Parliament was removed, Brüning passed his measures in 
even more drastic form by presidential decree. The executive, as headed by Brüning, was 
thus largely free from the Parliament and had no real need for its support.50 This set a 
significant precedent, and once Brüning himself was dismissed by Hindenburg on 30 May 
1932,51 the successive Cabinets of Franz von Papen and Kurt von Schleicher – the so-called 
‘Presidential Cabinets’ – were made up almost exclusively of his appointees, with almost no 
members of the Parliament or any pretence of democratic intention. These were entirely 
legitimate measures according to the letter of the Constitution. The full import of the 
cumulative effect of the way the Constitution was drafted in this regard  and the authoritarian 
rule it facilitated is most clearly displayed by the pure statistics of parliamentary activity 
towards the end of the Republic’s short fourteen-year life. As Eberhard Kolb has pointed out: 
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Die Zahl der Sitzungstage des Reichstags ging von 94 im Jahr 1930 (davon 67 nach 
dem Ende der Großen Koalition) über 42 im Jahr 1931 auf nur 13 im Jahr 1932 zurück. 
Wurden 1930 vom Reichstag noch 98 Gesetze beschlossen, so waren es 1931 lediglich 
34 und 1932 gar nur 5. Dagegen stieg die Zahl der vom Reichspräsidenten als 
Notverordnungen erlassenen Gesetze von 5 im Jahr 1930 über 44 im Jahr 1931 auf 66 
im Jahr 1932.52 
These events contributed substantially to the rise and appointment of the Nazis, in a sequence 
of events too detailed to be described here. It should also be noted that these presidential 
decrees provided a precedent for the Nazis after January 1933, and their widespread use 
preceding that date likely contributed to the subsequent credulity among the electors in 
accepting the Nazi measures: “It was the establishment of the constitutional dictatorship that 
then allowed Hitler, after being appointed chancellor, to establish a Nazi dictatorship.”53  
The manner in which the democratic political parties of the Weimar Republic conducted 
themselves, partly as a consequence of the conflicting form in which the separation of powers 
had been drafted into the Constitution, while of secondary significance to the parliamentary 
deadlock outlined above, also requires a brief examination, given the credibility these actions 
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lent to the abuse heaped on the democratic system by those groups and individuals who 
rejected it, and the subsequent loss of confidence in the system among the political classes: 
the title of Edgar Jung’s publication deriding the democratic system, Die Herrschaft der 
Minderwertigen,54might seem all too apt.  
Carl Schmitt, the legal academic, was the “hervorragendste Vertreter” of the view which 
characterized “den Parlamentarismus als ein überholtes politisches System” and he contested 
whether it, “überhaupt noch eine geistige Grundlage besitze.”55 The apparent inadequacy of 
the system as it stood and the mention by writers of varying political persuasions of the value 
of leadership and the German historical precedent for strong government gave new purchase 
to those groups who had always decried democracy as an ‘un-German’ form of government – 
something arising out of the French revolution and altogether foreign to German ideas – a 
call which came predominantly from the right of the party-political spectrum. Indeed, even 
those politicians of the right who had been active in the democratic governments of the 
Republic expressed heated dislike for the entire system, with former Reichsminister Martin 
Schiele of the DNVP writing in 1926: 
Wir beklagen es, dass die Weimarer Verfassung, geboren aus geschichtsloser 
Verkennung unserer staatlichen Bedürfnisse, unserem Volk statt organischen Aufbaus 






dürre Dogmen brachte; wir wundern uns nicht, dass sie [. . .] statt eines konstruktiven 
ein destruktives Werk geworden ist.56 
However, as Karl Kroeschell has pointed out, it was not only reactionaries who opposed the 
democracy that had emerged from the debates and struggles of 1918-19: “Darüber darf man 
freilich nicht vergessen, dass es auch Republikfeindschaft auf der Linken gab.”57 Indeed, 
within the SPD itself, namely from the Jungsozialisten, was the shibboleth to be heard, 
“Republik – das ist nicht viel: Sozialismus ist das Ziel!”58 As Sontheimer has so accurately 
indicated, the complaints made against the democratic system as established in 1919 not only 
criticised the way in which the State had come to function in practice, but also put forward 
other notions as to how the polity ought to be structured: “Die negative Funktion des anti-
demokratischen Denkens, das Anti gegen die herrschende Demokratie, ist ja in aller Regel 
gekoppelt mit einem Pro für einen anders gestalteten Staat.”59 With the apparent 
impracticality of the parliamentary system being displayed regularly in the rise and fall of 
short-term unstable governments and the prevalence of so many other theories of government 
circulating in the public fora, by the 1930s it seemed almost inevitable that the system was to 
be replaced with something else:  
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Die Liberalen mochten [in der Weimarer Verfassung] noch am ehestens [sic] ein 
Gebilde sehen, das ihrer Vorstellung vom richtigen Staatswesen entsprach; aber sie 
verloren im Laufe der vierzehn Jahre nicht allein ihre relative politische Bedeutung, die 
zuletzt fast gleich null war, sondern auch manches von ihrem ersten Glauben an die 
Richtigkeit ihrer liberalen Prinzipien.60 
This effect on the manner in which the political parties behaved – a form of behaviour 
precipitated by the constitutional construction of their role vis-à-vis the President – combined 
with the actions taken initially in an attempt to react with a strong hand to the economic 
exigencies of the time, played eventually into the hands of those reactionary forces who 
wished to install authoritarian government in Germany. As Boldt has pointed out with regard 
to Article 48: “Subjektiv mochte er bis zuletzt als ein gegen die nationalsozialistische Diktatur 
gerichtetes Mittel verstanden worden sein. Objekiv hatte seine Handhabung eben dieser 
Diktatur die Wege geebnet.”61 Research into the causes for this state of affairs has 
implications, not only for a deepening of our understanding of why democratic government in 
Germany disintegrated in the 1930s, but also for our understanding of the issues involved in 












The difference between God and the historians consists above all in the fact that God cannot 




This literature review outlines two dominant ideas in the existing scholarship on the liberal 
drafters of the Weimar Constitution and their conceptions of the Presidency, namely that the 
groups and individuals who were the driving forces behind the Constitution wanted a non-
authoritarian, pluralist-democratic system of government, and that they were unaware of 
where the Presidential powers could – and did – ultimately lead. The critical analysis which 
follows the literature review interrogates those two ideas with reference to primary sources 
such as the proceedings of the National Assembly and the writings of Hugo Preuβ and Max 
Weber. 
Scholarly opinion on the drafters’ general political outlook is fairly evenly divided, with 
some authors arguing that they were free of any authoritarian tendency, and other authors 
suggesting that they harboured profound (if perhaps unconscious) reservations about pluralist 




Because of the DDP’s central part in creating the president’s office and because of 
some isolated remarks of intellectuals close to the DDP, the party has been accused of 
having an affinity for fascism, of longing for a führer.  This is absurd. What the DDP 
wanted was a strong but democratic leader able to overcome the divisions and 
weakness of the Reichstag and still responsible to the people.62 
It is interesting to note that Frye sees a philosophical continuity between the liberal drafters 
of the Weimar Constitution and the Deutsche Staatspartei (which was formed in July 1930 
from a merger of the DDP, which was by that point in terminal decline, and the 
Volksnationale Reichsvereinigung, which was the political arm of the anti-Semitic 
Jungdeutsche Orden), as he writes immediately after the passage quoted about that: “This 
desire existed after July 1930 as well, when the DStP succeeded the DDP and the crisis of 
German democracy deepened.”63 
Elmar M. Hucko also vehemently rejects the idea that the drafters wished for anything other 
than a pluralist-democratic state: 
Critics of the Weimar Constitution have often pointed out that the President occupied 
the position of Ersatzkaiser or acted as a regent for the Hohenzollern monarchy. This 
criticism is a travesty of the actual intention of the fathers of the Constitution. Not for 
one moment did they mourn the Kaiser’s departure.64 







This last comment seems particularly overstated given that one of those fathers, Max Weber, 
was a chthonic nationalist about whom it has been said that, “[n]either as a scholar nor as a 
political man of action could he really see Germany living up to its potential greatness under 
a republican regime.”65 The conflicting view – and the view with which this thesis will align 
– is perhaps best represented by Hans Mommsen and Ernst Fraenkel. Thus Mommsen states 
that the Weimar Constitution has been criticised as being the product of an “authoritarian 
frame of mind” and admits that this criticism is “not without some justification.”66 Similarly, 
Fraenkel writes: “Die angeblich demokratischste Verfassung der Welt war das Produkt 
obrigkeitsstaatlichen Denkens.”67 
The second aspect of the scholarship here analysed – the idea that the liberal drafters of 1919 
were unaware of the potential for the powers which they had vested in the President to be 
used in a quasi-dictatorial manner – has broad support, though it is sometimes asserted in the 
face of evidence to the contrary. Thus Karl Dietrich Bracher, in Deutschland zwischen 
Demokratie und Diktatur, describes how the USPD criticised the proposed Presidential 
powers during the debates in the National Assembly, the party’s fear that the Presidency was 
“eine gefährliche Reminiszenz des wilhelminischen Systems”68 and Preuß’s response that, 








“das parlamentarische System enthalte starke Garantien gegen jeden Mißbrauch der 
Staatsgewalt.”69 He concludes by writing that 
in der endgültigen Fassung wurden alle weiteren Versuche, die präsidiale Gewalt 
einzuschränken [. . .] abgelehnt, die später so bedeutsame (und verhängnisvolle) 
Ausnahme “Diktaturgewalt” des Reichspräsidenten (Art. 48) ist in ihrem vollen 
Gewicht bei diesen Beratungen offenbar nicht erkannt worden.70 
In his earlier work Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik, Bracher also asserts that Article 48 
was designed specifically with someone like Ebert – the President during the Republic’s first 
turbulent years – in mind, and was only imagined as a tool for the defence of democracy, 
rather than for the subversion of it: 
Dabei war auch diese Einfügung der Ausnahme- und Notverordnungsgewalt des 
Reichspräsidenten deutlich auf die Gestalt Eberts zugeschnitten und keineswegs als 
Mittel zur Transzendierung, sondern vielmehr zur ungeschmälerten Erhaltung der 
verfassungsmäßigen Ordnung in Krisentagen gemeint.71 
Hans Mommsen takes a similar view of the drafters’ conception of the Presidency, 
notwithstanding his comments (noted above on p.31) about their “authoritarian frame of 
mind”: 







The possibility that the constitutional system could be destroyed by manipulation of the 
democratic process never occurred to the members of the National Assembly, 
particularly since protection of the constitution seemed to be secured through 
exceptional powers, such as the right to declare a state of emergency and to assume 
special executive power, that were granted to the president.72  
This view is paralleled by Kolb, who states that: 
Die potentielle Tragweite dieses Artikels 48 erkannte die Parlamentsmehrheit nicht, er 
war zwischen den Parteien der Regierungskoalition nicht umstritten, ja die 
ursprüngliche Fassung erfuhr in den Ausschußberatungen noch eine Verschärfung – 
trotz eindringlicher Warnung der USPD vor einem derartigen Blankoscheck für den 
Reichspräsidenten.73  
Kolb thus acknowledges that the USPD pointed out the potential for the powers contained in 
Article 48 to be misused, but maintains that the “potentielle Tragweite” of the Article was 
unrecognised. It is interesting to note that a few paragraphs later, during a discussion as to 
how the “Verfassungsväter” conceived the President as an “Ersatzkaiser” of sorts, Kolb 
indicates one very potent reason why the potential for quasi-dictatorial misuse of the 
Presidential powers could have been noticed and yet ignored by the bourgeois parties that 
exercised the most influence over the composition of the Constitution:  
Unbeschränkter Parlamentarismus konnte dazu führen, dass eines Tages eine 
sozialistische Parlamentsmehrheit regieren würde – immerhin waren im Januar 1919 





die beiden sozialistischen Parteien zusammen nur knapp unter der 50%-Marke 
geblieben.74 
David Dyzenhaus’s analysis echoes that of Bracher, Hans Mommsen and Kolb. After a 
detailed exposition of the powers granted by Article 48, the limitations placed upon the 
exercise of that provision and the position of the President in that regard, he makes a self-
contradictory assertion: 
However, there was an obvious weakness in these limitations, which was not fully 
appreciated at the time. The President could get rid of the supervision of the Reichstag 
over his measures taken in terms of Article 48 by continued use of his authority to 
dissolve that body.75 
Again, without placing an emphasis on syntax and word-choice that was not intended by the 
scholar in question, it would seem incongruous to suggest that a weakness is “obvious” and 
yet “was not fully appreciated at the time” and thus to attribute a significant lack of political 
awareness to a National Assembly replete with experienced politicians no less than with 
jurists, sociologists and economists. Indeed, this view finds support in the work of Winkler, 
who has commented that the possibility was known to the Assembly members and that it was 
fear of a Socialist majority – mentioned by Kolb above, but not explicitly acknowledged as a 
cause – which caused them to draft the powers of the President in the form which they did:   





Es war ebendieser Effekt, der die bürgerliche Mehrheit der Nationalversammlung für 
die direkte Volkswahl des Reichspräsidenten, seine siebenjährige Amtszeit und seine 
umfassenden Befugnisse im – weitgefaßten – Notstandsfall votieren ließ.76 
Thus Winkler and, by implication, Kolb are some of only a few scholars – including Lothar 
Albertin, as will be noted below – who suggest that the liberal drafters were aware of what 
they were doing in designing the Presidency in this way. In the critical analysis which 
follows, this thesis re-examines the dominant ideas in the existing scholarship about how the 
liberal drafters of the Weimar Constitution regarded pluralist democracy in general, and 
about how they conceived the Presidential powers in particular. With reference to relevant 
primary sources – the debates which took place in the National Assembly and the 
contemporary writings of Hugo Preuß and Max Weber – the thesis suggests a more 
differentiated interpretation of the drafters’ understanding of the Republic and the Presidency. 
Thus the thesis firstly aligns itself with the view (advanced by scholars such as Hans 
Mommsen and Fraenkel) that the drafters had substantial reservations about pluralist 
democracy, and secondly – and perhaps more importantly – the thesis argues that there is far 
more evidence than scholars have generally acknowledged that the drafters understood what 










The first issue to be addressed is the views of the DDP and its members toward 
authoritarianism in government. The ideas of both Weber and Preuß about the polity in 
general, and the President’s role specifically, are indicative of their respective attitudes 
toward the Constitution as a whole. Weber was a strong advocate for the role of a powerful 
President in the unofficial Constitutional Committee, and in the public press, and he 
predicated his argument around the belief that democracy without strong leadership would 
not be conducive to effective debate and the cogent advancement of political philosophies: 
“The danger which mass democracy presents to national politics consists principally in the 
possibility that emotional elements will become predominant in politics”77 [his emphasis]. 
Weber had a “deprecatory” view of “the modern masses”,78 and distrusted any form of 
government which could lead to the “unregulated rule of the street.”79 He warned against 
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being misled by “the term ‘democratization’” and any hopes it might cultivate as to the pace 
of democratic development in post-World War One Europe because 
the demos itself, in the sense of a shapeless mass, never ‘governs’ larger associations, 
but rather is governed. What changes is only the way in which the executive leaders are 
selected and the measures of influence which the demos, or better, which social circles 
from the midst are able to exert upon the content and the direction of administrative 
activities by means of ‘public opinion.’80   
These excerpts from Weber’s Economy and Society, despite being written sometime before 
his death in 1920 (the work was published posthumously in 1922), are quite an accurate 
description of the state of German politics towards the end of the Republic’s life: a non-
democratic selection of the executive, with the election of a mere social-representative body 
in the form of the Parliament. His remarks in both the Wiesbadener Zeitung and Heidelberger 
Tageblatt (see above p.17) are evidence of his related argumentation in favour of a 
centralised presidential role, as distinct from pluralistic parliamentary democracy. There was 
a need, in his view, for a charismatic leader who would have been trained and gained 
experience in the conflictual practices of parliaments that operated more as areas and 
mechanisms of leader-selection rather than as typical representative bodies.81 Weber, it 
seemed, had no great confidence in the development of a functional parliamentary democracy 
in Germany, though writing in 1917 he noted that it was not the absence of an Anglo-Saxon-
style two-party system which was the problem: 






Weit wichtiger ist eine andere Schwierigkeit: parlamentarische Regierung ist nur 
möglich, wenn die größten Parteien prinzipiell zur Übernahme der verantwortlichen 
Leitung der Staatsgeschäfte überhaupt bereit sind. Und das war freilich bisher bei uns 
keineswegs der Fall.82 [His emphasis]  
Weber, as can be deduced from his writings, was not an avowed democrat and perceived 
many problems inherent in the development of that form of government, which is recognised 
less within the scholarship on the Weimar Constitution than outside of it. While Frye 
concedes to this assessment of Weber’s priorities to some degree, “His greatest concern – and 
this was also the DDP’s most pressing goal – was to preserve the unity and strength of the 
Reich”,83 the scholarship on Weber’s ideas alone, as distinct from his statements on the 
Weimar Constitution specifically, goes much further: “In the end, he placed his bet on the 
extraordinary powers of the charismatic politician to break through the dangers plaguing 
disenchanted mass-democratic societies.”84 The parliament was conceived as “only important 
because it was the arena or ‘proving ground’, which could promote a great and charismatic 
leader, which in turn was vital for Germany to emerge as a Machtstaat.”85 It is even 
mentioned that Weber regarded the Republic as a “necessary evil”86 which he could bring 










himself to serve only with “the ethos of a public servant”87 and there are far more overt 
statements as to the inapplicability of the term ‘democrat’ to Weber:  
That Weber’s commitment to democracy was at best instrumental bears emphasis. He 
had no patience with believers in popular sovereignty or the “will of the people.” In 
1908 he told Robert Michels that ‘such expressions were fictitious’ and that if Michels 
cherished such illusions, he “still had great disillusions to suffer.”88  
Weber’s ideas found a parallel in Preuß’s writings and statements on the Presidency, though 
the latter tended to couch his views in more moderate language. The importance of having a 
centralised figure of authority in the body politic was just as prevalent in Preuß’s publications 
on constitutional matters. Writing in January 1919 in the Reichsanzeiger in accompaniment 
to his newly-published constitutional draft he advanced the view, when commenting on the 
seven-year term of the President when compared with the four-years allowed for Parliament, 
that a strong centralised Presidency was conducive to inculcating stability in political life: 
Dieser Amtstermin selbst wird bei solcher Möglichkeit, in ernsten und wichtigen Fällen 
auch während seiner Dauer an das Volk appellieren zu können, auf einen längeren 
Zeitraum zu bemessen sein, um im Amte des Reichspräsidenten ein Element ruhiger 
Dauer in den staatlichen Organismus einzufügen.89  







The fact of the President’s term of office being considerably longer than the Parliament’s was 
a central problem in constitutional construction – causing the former, rather than the latter, to 
be seen as the focal-point of stability in Germany and German politics – as is pointed out by 
Kraus,90 Bracher91 and others. While this is cited in the scholarship as a clear problem in the 
Constitution, the scholars who note the error fail to recognise that this is, in fact, the very role 
the President was designed to play. The stability which the Presidency was intended to lend 
the political process required that he be granted various constitutional advantages over 
Parliament. Preuß advocated a directly and popularly elected Presidency as one such 
advantage, deriding the alternative of the Parliament appointing the President as “unechten 
Parlamentarismus.” Thus in the article published in November 1918, on the day Ebert offered 
him the post of Staatssekretär des Innern, Preuß described the importance of establishing 
stability in the new democratic system and the necessity of the President being elected 
directly by the people in order to facilitate that aim:  
Dies bedingt jedoch nicht die Wahl des Präsidenten durch das Parlament, wie in 
Frankreich. Im Gegenteil kann man dieses französische System treffend als unechten 
Parlamentarismus bezeichnen. Der echte Parlamentarismus setzt nämlich zwei einander 
wesentlich ebenbürtige höchste Staatsorgane voraus; unterscheidet sich jedoch vom 
Dualismus dadurch, dass sie nicht in unverbundener Gegensätzlichkeit 
nebeneinanderstehen, sondern dass die parlamentarische Regierung das bewegliche 
Bindeglied zwischen ihnen bildet. In der parlamentarischen Demokratie, in der alle 
politische Gewalt vom Volkswillen ausgeht, erhält der Präsident die ebenbürtige 





Stellung neben der vom Volke unmittelbar gewählten Volksvertretung nur, wenn er 
nicht von dieser selbst, sondern unmittelbar vom Volke gewählt wird.92 
He expressed similar views in the specific context of the powers which ought to be granted to 
the President to facilitate this conception of his important role:  
Die Ernennung des Reichskanzlers und in Übereinstimmung mit ihm die der anderen 
Mitglieder der Reichsregierung ist die wichtigste selbständige Funktion des 
Reichspräsidenten. Hierin vor allem hat er seine politische Führereigenschaft zu 
bewähren. Ein aus der Volkswahl hervorgegangener, also im politischen Treiben 
voraussichtlich erfahrener Führer kann die mannigfaltigen dabei in Betracht 
kommenden politischen und fachlichen Gesichtspunkte unzweifelhaft sicherer und 
besser abwägen und zur Entscheidung bringen, als es im Wege unmittelbarer 
parlamentarischer Wahlen möglich ist.93  
Preuß therefore seems to have embodied the prevailing liberal view with regard to the 
primacy of the Presidency, in which the holder of that office was the real leader of the State 
and intended to be the individual best equipped to deal with the exigencies of political life, 
which in drafting terms meant that he was to be granted various advantages over parliament. 
The DDP did not imagine that the President should be hampered by the will of the masses, 
but rather that he should school the masses in his role as leader. In the National Assembly the 
DDP’s Abgeordneter Dr Bruno Ablass stated: 





Ganz gewiss ist auch das meine Auffassung [. . .], dass Sichbekennen zur Demokratie 
vor allem heißt ein Bekenntnis dahin ablegen, dass wir Führer des Volkes brauchen, die 
das Volk leiten und lenken aus dem Bewusstsein ihrer Pflicht dem Volke gegenüber. 
Das ist es, was wir wünschen und wollen; nicht dass die Masse der Führer ist, sondern 
dass der Abgeordnete, der Erwählte, derjenige Führer ist, der nicht sklavisch dasjenige 
ausführt, was ihm als Befehl der Masse vorgetragen wird, sondern der ein Leiter, ein 
Lenker der Masse ist, ein Erzieher des Volkes. So denken wir uns die Stellung eines 
Abgeordneten, eines Führers und auch eines Präsidenten.94 
Preuß was also an advocate of the idea that an executive must be given freedom to act in the 
manner it sees fit – and not be hampered by onerous restrictions on the exercise of power – 
and the related notion that the Parliament should be a training/selection ground for the 
individuals who were to make up that executive, rather than the central legislative body:  
Es ist vielleicht die größte Gefahr, die einer Demokratie erwachsen kann, wenn durch 
allzu gehäufte Kontrollmaßregeln die demokratische Regierung allzusehr am Regieren 
behindert wird. Der Parlamentarismus soll die Schule, die Auslese der demokratischen 
Führer sein.95  
This belief in the need for a training and selection process for future leaders was based on the 
reservations Preuß and his colleagues had about the political maturity of the German people.  
For example he questioned his compatriots’ readiness for a truly democratic government in 
the public press: 






Doch auch für die, die seit langem im geistigen Kampfe gegen das Obrigkeitssystem 
standen, bedeutet die fast unvermittelte Schnelligkeit des Umschwunges zu der von 
ihnen stets erstrebten Entwicklung eine sehr ernste Gefährdung. Sie verleitet 
unwillkürlich zu der Vorstellung, das [sic] schon geschehen sei, womit zu beginnen 
doch erst die Möglichkeit, aber auch die zwingendste Notwendigkeit gegeben ist. Sie 
legt es nur allzu nahe, die Ersatzmittel, zu denen im Drange des Augenblicks gegriffen 
werden musste, mit dem echten Material zu verwechseln, aus dem der neue Bau nur in 
langer, zäher und energischster Arbeit errichtet werden kann. Einst bestätigte Erfahrung 
den Satz: man kann einen Liberalen zum Minister machen, hat aber damit noch keinen 
liberalen Minister. Jetzt gilt noch sicherer: man kann Parlamentarier und Demokraten 
haufenweise zu Ministern und Staatssekretären machen, hat aber damit noch keinen 
Parlamentarismus und keine Demokratie.96 
As this quotation suggests, the conception of the position of President which was advanced 
by the liberals in their pre-revolutionary scholarship did not change after the revolution and 
during the drafting of the Constitution; indeed, the office of the Presidency became even 
more central in their minds as a bulwark against the possible threats which were a cause for 
so much contemporary anxiety during the November Revolution. It is possible that the 
creation of a powerful President was seen as necessary to protect against these threats and, in 








order to enable the office-holder to fulfill this role, it was considered unwise to hamper the 
exercise of these powers, lest that lead to a crippling of his protective role.  
Preuß seemed to view the development of the new constitutional order as a stark choice 
between bloody revolution and democratic reform. He believed that the German people had 
experienced a campaign against the concept of democracy throughout their lives and that they 
had to an extent accepted this argument, which made the establishment of a truly democratic 
State in contemporary Germany difficult, especially in the absence of broad-based 
community consensus for the change. But he considered the alternative worse:  
Wie haben uns die Reaktionäre die Entwicklung in der Art der “westlichen 
Demokratien” zu verekeln gesucht; und nicht nur Liberale, auch Sozialdemokraten sind 
ihnen auf den Leim gegangen. Wollen wir jetzt statt dessen den Bolschewismus 
nachahmen, die negative Platte des russischen Zarismus? In epigrammatischer 
Zuspitzung, doch im Kerne treffend, schreibt eben jetzt Albert Thomas in der 
“Humanité”: “Entweder Wilson oder Lenin, entweder die aus der französischen 
Revolution hervorgegangene und von der amerikanischen Republik weiter entwickelte 
Demokratie oder die brutalen Formen des russischen Fanatismus. Man muss wählen.”97 
The bourgeoisie’s fear about the internal situation in Germany and the possibility of a 
Russian-style revolution dramatically influenced their thinking when drafting the 
Constitution in early 1919. Albertin notes, the widespread civil unrest led to “a remarkable 




pre-occupation with the need to strengthen the executive which marked the first decisions of 
the National Assembly.”98 He goes on to say: 
On the day prior to the first plenary session one DDP deputy declared frankly that, “the 
most important thing was to have a disciplined army.” This was how many looked at 
the priorities facing Germany [. . .]. The laws concerning the preliminary Reich 
executive power (February 10, 1919) and the formation of a provisional Reichswehr 
(March 6, 1919) were ratified with extreme haste.99 
The arguments propounded in this section of the thesis, namely that the drafters desired – 
with varying degrees of passion – for the Presidency to represent a central authority with the 
power to act in the face of threats to the State, and that the parliament was not designed to be 
a governing body, so much as a socially-representative one, therefore diverge from the 
interpretations of scholars such as Frye and Hucko (which are discussed above on pp.29-31). 
Rather, the thesis is aligned with the interpretation of Fraenkel and Albertin. Fraenkel writes 
that: 
Im Denken der Väter der Weimarer Verfassung spukt noch die Vorstellung, dass das 
Oberhaupt der Exekutive dazu berufen sei, das Volksganze zu symbolisieren und das 
Gesamtinteresse wahrzunehmen. Dank ihres Unverständnisses für die repräsentativen 
Aufgaben eines Parlaments schufen sie eine plebiszitär-autoritäre Verfassung. Ein 
Volk, das seinem Parlament nicht die Fähigkeit zur Repräsentation zutraut, leidet an 






einem demokratischen Minderwertigkeitskomplex. Die angeblich demokratischste 
Verfassung der Welt war das Produkt obrigkeitsstaatlichen Denkens.100 
Similarly, Albertin concludes that: 
If one follows the statements made by the Democrats, the role of Parliament was 
merely to support the government rather than to control or guide it. Parliament was to 
help in the selection and training of leaders and to give the liberal ideal of the 
individual personality, acting within a representative mandate, a new and belated lease 
of life. And possibly it could even serve as a platform for new concepts as had been 
sketched out in Max Weber’s typology of a plebiscitarian “Führer” democracy. Under 
the circumstances it was not surprising that the position of the Reich President was 
interpreted in an authoritarian fashion.101  
On the basis of the primary sources examined above, it could perhaps be suggested that the 
political state of affairs which eventuated toward the end of the Republic was the one 
originally intended by the liberal drafters in 1919: a powerful President elected by the people 
and a Parliament which was a social-representative body. The opinions of Weber and Preuß 
reflected those of the liberal bourgeois as represented by the DDP and are cited here because 
they were among the most productive and widely published of their contemporary intellectual 
peers; and Preuß in particular held the central role in the drafting process.  
The second issue to be addressed is the evidence that the liberals were aware, or at the 
very least could not have remained ignorant in the face of comments and arguments from 





others, that the powers of the President as enumerated in the Constitution had inherent 
authoritarian potential. There is considerable evidence that such comments and arguments 
were advanced, and that they were discounted by the DDP, in the proceedings of the National 
Assembly. Upon examining the draft constitution Abgeordneter Hermann Molkenbuhr 
(MSPD) told the Assembly that he, “‘[fand] ziemlich alles’ wieder [. . .], ‘was die alte 
Verfassung an reaktionären Bestimmungen besessen’ habe.”102 The continuity with previous 
German Constitutions, particularly with respect to provisions regulating the use of executive 
power during extraordinary situations, was pointed out by Dr Oskar Cohn of the USPD, “der 
Verfassungsexperte der USPD.”103 When the debate turned to Article 48 he called the 
Assembly’s attention to the fact that the provision replicated reactionary clauses in previous 
Constitutions: 
Geehrte Versammlung! Die Bücher, die ich hier vor mir habe, sollen Sie nicht 
erschrecken; sie sind lediglich dazu bestimmt, Ihnen den Nachweis zu führen, dass der 
Art. 49, wie er hier vorgeschlagen ist, uns in den Rechtszustand zurückführen soll, der 
vor dem Jahre 1848 in Preußen bestanden hat.104  
Subsequent debates about Parliamentary oversight of the President’s exercise of his powers 
under Article 48 offer a particularly interesting insight into the drafters’ expectations of those 
powers. The bourgeois majority actually extended the powers of the executive, despite the 
mentioned warnings from the USPD’s Dr Cohn. Up until July 30, the draft Constitution 







required that the measures taken under Article 48 have the approval of the Parliament; the 
DDP requested that this be changed to require that the parliament only be notified, against the 
opposition of the two socialist parties who pointed out the dangers to which such a change 
could lead, saying that a President who knows he does not need the approval of the 
Parliament will be more inclined to act too quickly, too harshly and altogether without 
reflection as to where the measures could lead – in the words of Abgeordneter Katzenstein 
(MSPD), “Es ist besser, es wird vorher geprüft. Es ist besser, der Reichspräsident weiß 
vorher, dass er nachher die Genehmigung haben muss.”105 By contrast the DDP position was 
to allow the President as much freedom as possible, as put by Dr Haas: 
Mit unserem Abänderungsantrag auf Nr. 703 erstreben wir zunächst eine formelle 
Erleichterung für den Reichspräsidenten bei Erklärung des Belagerungszustandes [. . .]. 
Dann haben wir gegen die jetzige Fassung das starke Bedenken, das jedesmal, wenn 
der Belagerungszustand erklärt wird, nachträglich der Reichstag seine Genehmigung zu 
erteilen hat. Das würde bedeuten, dass, wenn in irgend einem Orte in Deutschland 
Unruhen entstehen und der Belagerungszustand notwendig wird, eine Verhandlung im 
Reichstag stattfinden muss. Das wäre doch unzweckmäßig. Wir sind der Meinung, dass 
der Reichspräsident seine Anordnungen lediglich dem Reichstag, und zwar zu Händen 
des Präsidenten des Reichstags, mitzuteilen hat. 106  
During this debate as to how onerous the restrictions to be placed upon the use of Article 48 
should be, the DDP was as one in their opposition to the suggestion that the measures should 





require the approval of the Parliament, rather than that body simply having to be notified of 
their implementation. Abgeordneter Koch of the DDP said in no uncertain terms: 
Wenn wir überhaupt dazu kommen wollen, unsere Demokratie lebensfähig zu erhalten, 
müssen wir dafür sorgen, dass sie marschieren kann, und dürfen die von uns gewählten 
Führer nicht bei jedem Schritt, den sie unternehmen wollen, noch drei bis fünfmal mit 
Beratungen und Beschlußfassungen aufhalten. (Zustimmung bei den Deutschen 
Demokraten).107 
Therefore, as few restrictions as possible were placed on the exercise of executive authority 
to fulfill this aim; to allow “democracy” to “march.” There may have been legitimate 
concerns about the ability of an emergency presidential government to govern if too many 
limitations were imposed on it, but in the face of the arguments presented by the other 
members of the National Assembly indicating the potential for abuse of these powers, usually 
the USPD, it cannot be posited without fear of contradiction that the liberal drafters were 
unaware of that potential. It can, of course, be posited – and indeed is posited in this thesis – 
that the liberal drafters were aware of the problems and simply accepted them.  
Further to that, the MSPD was as disturbed by the violent upheaval the country had 
experienced – and was experiencing – as the bourgeois parties of the National Assembly and 
was equally in favour of strengthening the executive powers in order to prevent any future 
activities which could threaten the State, though they pointed out the dangers which could 
possibly arise as a result. When arguing in favour of Article 48 – while there was 
disagreement amongst the government parties as to the details concerning the Article and the 
manner in which it interacted with other aspects of the Constitution, its ‘necessity’ was not in 




question – Abgeordneter Katzenstein (MSPD) used the analogy of the burning building to 
make his party’s point: 
Es ist nun einmal nicht zu vermeiden: wenn ein Brand gelöscht wird, dann entsteht 
Wasserschaden, und es gibt sogar Fälle, wo der Wasserschaden größer wird als der 
Brandschaden gewesen ist. Aber wenn die Feuerwehr nicht eingreift, dann wird der 
Brand unendlich größer, und die Brandstifter schreien über die Feuerwehr. Das kann 
uns also nicht abschrecken.108  
This quote, selected as representative of the view of the MSPD as a party, is evidence of the 
vigorous discussion which took place with the National Assembly regarding Article 48 and 
the potential damage it could cause, and indicates the likelihood that the liberals would have 
been made aware by the comments and debate going on around them of the potential inherent 
in the Article. During this reading of the constitutional draft in the National Assembly, the 
USPD’s Cohn was especially critical of the anomalous manner in which the bourgeois parties 
talked of democracy while insisting on instituting such dubiously democratic provisions as 
Article 48: 
Wollen Sie das, dann haben Sie Verantwortung dafür zu tragen. Nur machen Sie sich 
selbst nichts weis und versuchen Sie nicht, die Öffentlichkeit darüber zu täuschen, als 
ob Sie, wenn Sie einen solchen Art. 49 annehmen, Sie noch irgendetwas mit 
Demokratie zu tun hätten. (Sehr gut! bei den Unabhängigen Sozialdemokraten) Wenn 
dieser Art. 49 Gesetz geworden ist, dann wird die rückschauende Betrachtung einmal 
feststellen: Die Nationalversammlung, der Gaul, ist ausgezogen, das Königreich der 




Demokratie zu gewinnen, und er ist heimgekehrt mit dem Esel dieser Verfassung. (Sehr 
gut! und Beifall bei den Unabhängigen Sozialdemokraten).109   
The apparent wish of the bourgeois majority in the National Assembly to allow the President 
as much freedom to respond to the political needs of the moment influenced their voting 
patterns regarding the President’s powers to a remarkable degree. When it came to a debate 
of the constitutional draft on Article 25 and the length of time the Parliament was able to be 
dissolved for before new elections were to be held, the USPD and MSPD were in agreement 
in suggesting that the time should be reduced from sixty to thirty days, given the importance 
they generally placed on the parliamentary body as a whole. The MSPD pointed out that, 
“Die Aufstellung der Kandidaten ist gerade bei dem System der Verhältniswahl eine viel 
weniger entscheidende Frage als bei dem Einerwahlsystem, das wir früher gehabt haben.”110 
MSPD Abgeordneter Katzenstein also pointed out the danger to which such an extended 
period of time with only a President in control of the government could lead:  
Dass aber ein Zustand unerträglich ist, bei dem im Falle der Auflösung, also der 
allerhöchsten politischen Spannung, vielleicht bei einem schweren Konflikt zwischen 
dem Reichspräsidenten und dem Reichstag, der Reichstag zwei Monate ausgeschaltet 
sein soll, scheint mir doch klar zu sein. Man muss die Frist, in der der Reichstag unter 
solchen Umständen nicht versammelt ist, auf eine möglichst kurze Zeit beschränken.111 






The motion failed due to opposition from the bourgeois parties, including those in 
government. This opposition was ostensibly due to the technical difficulties which would 
arise by having only thirty days to prepare the electoral lists of candidates, with Preuß 
responding to the proposition put forward by the USPD’s Abgeordneter Agnes by arguing 
that: 
Alle Wahltechniker werden bestätigen, dass es namentlich beim Proportionswahlrecht 
innerhalb dieses Zeitraumes, der durch den Antrag Agnes gefordert wird, unmöglich 
sein wird, die notwendigen Arbeiten ordnungsmäßig durchzuführen. Ich bitte, es bei 
der Frist des Entwurfs zu belassen.112 
The DDP’s Abgeordneter Koch made a different, though related, argument to that put 
forward by Preuß, which makes it clear that it is not purely technical reasons which account 
for their reluctance to shorten the period of time before which new elections are to be called. 
It ought to be recalled that the MSPD at this time was a highly organized party-political 
organization, especially compared with the DDP: 
Bei der Größe der gegenwärtigen Wahlbezirke ist die Aufstellung der Kandidatenliste 
eine Arbeit, die, wenn die Wähler nicht vollkommen in die Hand der Parteileitung 
geraten sollen, immerhin einen nicht unerheblichen Zeitaufwand erfordert. (Sehr 
richtig! bei den Deutschen Demokraten.)113  
Thus party-political concerns on the part of the bourgeois parties – the DNVP also spoke out 
against the motion, with Dr von Delbrück stating that he considered it, “wirklich für 





ausgeschlossen, dass in 30 Tagen” the “komplizierte Aufstellung des Wahlapparats”114 could 
take place – and the possibility of widespread success on the part of the socialist parties in 
any future election played a role in their determination of the length of time for which the 
parliament could be dissolved. But even if they were motivated by such political concerns in 
responding to the motion in the way they did, the central point is that they had to respond to a 
debate which discussed the potential dangers of allowing the longer time-frame to stand, and 
thus it cannot be claimed that they were unaware of these dangers.  
There is also evidence in the proceedings of the National Assembly that the bourgeois parties, 
in keeping with their conceptions of the Presidency and the place of Parliament as primarily a 
social-representative body, intended the selection of cabinet members to be in no way 
restricted to those parties which held the majority in the parliament. When debating Article 
53, Dr Heinze of the DVP suggested that the President should have absolute discretion as to 
the selection and dismissal of members of the cabinet,115 and Preuß answered the suggestion 
in the following manner: 
Ich muss Wert auf die Feststellung legen, dass die Fassung des Entwurfs in keiner 
Weise den höchst gesunden und richtigen Grundsätzen, die der Herr Abgeordnete Dr. 
Heinze eben ausgesprochen hat, entgegensteht. Genau so ist es von der Verfassung 
gedacht.116 






Thus the drafters of the Constitution were not only aware of where the powers granted to the 
President with regard to the selection of the Cabinet and Chancellor could lead – with the 
President having the ultimate discretion to select, essentially, whomever he thought fit – they 
intended these consequences on some level. It was not only the bourgeois parties which 
endeavored to facilitate this form of selection process: Dr Quark (MSPD), on behalf of his 
party, wholeheartedly agreed with the sentiments expressed: “Wir sind ebenfalls der 
Meinung, dass die weiteste Auswahl unter den Männern des Landes gegeben sein soll.”117 
Although the USPD representatives repeatedly called upon the National Assembly to restrict 
the power of the President and the manner in which he could exercise it, they were frequently 
ridiculed by the bourgeois members – with Preuß being no exception. Apart from his often 
exasperated response to suggestions put forward by other members of the Assembly during 
the third reading of the draft: “Die Frage ist von uns im Verfassungsausschuß sehr 
ausführlich erörtert worden”,118 the disdain which the bourgeois majority held for the 
Socialist members of the Assembly – particularly the USPD – is startling. The DDP often 
dismissed all the latter’s warnings about the potential dangers of constructing the powers of 
the President in the way that the liberals insisted by arguing that the Independent Socialists 
had themselves only a short time before the Assembly was elected acted in the dictatorial 
manner which they were warning against. Preuß himself was one of chief proponents of this 
line of attack: 
Ich weiß nicht, ob, wenn Herr Dr. Cohn eine Verfassung ganz nach seinem Sinn 
machen könnte, er Bestimmungen dieser Art entbehren könnte. (Sehr gut! bei den 





Deutschen Demokraten.) In der Praxis haben jedenfalls ihm politisch näher als uns 
stehende Kreise weder in Bremen noch in München und anderen Orten ohne 
Belagerungszustand regieren können. (Lebhafte Zustimmung rechts, im Zentrum und 
links. – Unruhe bei den Unabhängigen Sozialdemokraten.) Sie haben sogar mit einem 
Belagerungszustand regiert, zu dessen Härten man auf Grund dieser Bestimmungen 
niemals fortschreiten wird [. . .]. Hoffentlich vereinigen sich die Freunde des Herrn Dr. 
Cohn mit uns darin, Zustände herbeizuführen, die den Belagerungszustand überhaupt 
als überflüssig erscheinen lassen. (Beifall rechts, im Zentrum und bei den Deutschen 
Demokraten. – Zurufe bei den Unabhängigen Demokraten.)119  
Preuß thus acknowledged that the USPD had ruled in a dictatorial way through similar 
provisions, but argued that a similar possibility for abuse did not exist in the powers granted 
to the President in the Weimar Constitution, because, “die Anordnungen müssen außer Kraft 
treten, wenn es der Reichstag beschließt.”120 This is despite the fact that the President was 
granted the express power to dissolve that body on his authority alone: a fact of which Preuß 
cannot have been unaware, given the wide-ranging debates which had taken place in the 
preceding days (see above pp.47-52, 54); indeed, he wrote the power into the draft initially. 
Similar arguments were advanced for ignoring comments by the USPD about the potential 
for individual rights – specifically with regard to privacy of mail, phone and telegraph 
communication – to be abused under Article 48, with Dr Haas (DDP) asking Abgeordneter 
Cohn, “dass er doch bei seinen Freunden, wenn sie wieder einmal in irgendeiner Stadt die 
Macht in die Hand nehmen, dafür sorgt, dass dann das Telephon- und Telegraphengeheimnis 





gewahrt wird”, mentioning that these rights had been abused by the USPD in Mannheim once 
they had power “so ein klein wenig in der Hand.”121 The ridicule to which the Socialists – the 
USPD in particular – were subjected extended also to the public press, where they were 
lampooned as essentially untrustworthy: a central reason for their being ignored by their 
fellow Assembly members of a liberal persuasion. A witty example of this treatment can be 
found in the DVP-affiliated Tägliche Rundschau of 11 February 1919, where the concerns of 
the USPD vis-à-vis the powers of the President were derided: 
Aber Eberts ehedem Intime bei den Unabhängigen, die ihn Friedrich den 
Unüberwindlichen nennen, behaupten, sein Sitzfleisch sei das Dauerhafteste an ihm. 
Wo er einmal sitze, da gebe es gleich eine Dynastie. Daher auch das verzweifelte 
Bestreben des verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlungmitgliedes Cohn, an Stelle 
eines einzigen Präsidenten einen Fünf-Männer-Ausschuß zu setzen. Da könnte die 
Reichsgewalt doch wenigstens reihum gehen. Nach dem ABC natürlich. Und da käme 
Cohns C vor dem E unseres Ebert.122 
Despite being the butt of so many pointed comments, Dr Cohn was indefatigable in warning 
that the bourgeois parties were creating an overly powerful President. In responding to a 
particularly sarcastic barb from Preuß, which had implied that his statements of the preceding 
days had been contradictory, he gave a prescient summation of the situation as it stood in the 
Assembly: 
                                                     
121 Ibid., p.3249.  




Dem Herrn Vertreter des Reichsministeriums Dr. Preuß sind für die Erreichung des 
Zweckes, der ihm und mir gemeinsam ist, alle Mittel recht, auch die Mittel der 
unkontrollierten Gewalt, und ich bin gegen diese Mittel. (Bravo! bei den Unabhängigen 
Sozialdemokraten).123  
During a debate about the putative Article 164, which was to prohibit members of the ex-
imperial houses of Germany from holding the position of President either at all, for two 
generations, or for fifteen years, the majority of the National Assembly discounted the 
possibility of any coup d’état from the right. The debate shows how the DDP were made 
aware of the problems and dangers which could result from allowing such an individual to 
occupy the role of President and their summary rejection of these arguments. They argued 
against the inclusion of the Article, as put forward forcefully by Abgeordneter Ruschke: 
Wenn nur die Befürchtung auftaucht, die deutschen Fürsten könnten in absehbarer Zeit 
durch die Präsidentschaftswahl sich wiederum eine Position erringen, so teilen wir 
diese Befürchtung nicht. Wir haben das Vertrauen zum deutschen Volke, nachdem die 
republikanische Staatsform da ist, dass sie sich auch festigen wird, und wir sehen in 
den Anträgen der Sozialdemokraten und der Unabhängigen tatsächlich ein 
Angstprodukt. (Oho! bei den Sozialdemokraten.) Wir teilen diese Angst nicht, sondern 
haben das Vertrauen zum deutschen Volke, dass es keine Dummheiten machen wird    
[. . .]. Wir werden infolgedessen den Art. 164 ablehnen und ebenso den Antrag der 
Unabhängigen Sozialdemokraten. (Bravo! bei den Deutschen Demokraten.)124    





This position was taken by the liberals on the grounds that the choice of candidates able to be 
offered to the people of Germany for election to the position of President should not be 
restricted: if the German people chose to elect a member of an ex-imperial house, that was 
their prerogative: “da [der Präsident] aber durch das gesamte Volk gewählt wird und dieses 
souverän ist, darf die Verfassung das Volk in seiner Wahl nicht bevormunden.”125 These 
arguments were advanced against the background of the MSPD pointing out the negative 
experiences of other newly-formed democracies in not including such a clause, for example 
in the words of Abgeordneter Fischer: 
Weiter dürfen wir auch nicht vergessen, dass in der Verfassung eine Bestimmung fehlt, 
die Frankreich aus bitterer Erfahrung heraus in seine Verfassung aufgenommen hat, 
nämlich bei Bestimmung: 
Die Mitglieder der Familien, die in Frankreich regiert haben, sind für die 
Präsidentenschaft der Republik nicht wählbar. (Sehr gut! bei den Sozialdemokraten.) 
Ich glaube, es dürfte gar nicht unangebracht sein, zumal bei der großen Zahl solcher 
Bewerber um einen solchen Posten, diese Bestimmung auch in die Verfassung der 
deutschen Republik aufzunehmen. (Lebhafte Zustimmung bei den 
Sozialdemokraten.)126  
Despite the fact that this provision excluding such aristocrats from the post of President was 
not finally included in the document, the very existence of the debate shows that the 






individuals who drafted, discussed and finally voted on the Constitution were aware – and 
that those who were not aware were informed by the other members of the National 
Assembly – of the potential for the person occupying the position of President to do 
irreparable harm, if they so chose, to the effectiveness of democratic system in a nation with 
such a limited experience of that form of government. Dr Cohn, even made a prophetic 
statement regarding Article 48, in saying that one could only imagine what would happen, 
“wenn [. . . ] ein Trabant der Hohenzollern, vielleicht ein General, an der Spitze des Reichs 
oder des Reichswehrministeriums steht.”127 Yet Preuß in reply continued to discount any 
need for the powers to be constrained, largely because he thought it necessary to enable the 
government of the day to deal with problems expeditiously:  
Meine Herren, der Belagerungszustand ist ein unerwünschter Zustand (sehr richtig!), 
ein in jedem Falle unerwünschter Zustand; aber er muss doch gerade dem Zugreifen der 
Behörden [. . .] einen gewissen Spielraum in Einzelheiten verschaffen.128 
Given the evidence taken from the primary sources cited above, the proposition put forward 
by the majority of scholars that it “never occurred to the members of the National 
Assembly”129 that the powers granted to the President could be a detriment to the democratic 
process, and that the potential for these powers to be misused was “nicht erkannt 
worden”,130seems questionable. On the contrary, there seems to be considerable evidence to 







support the minority view of the literature. At the very least, given the wide-ranging 
arguments of various members of the Assembly, they could not have remained ignorant of 
the idea, even if they thought it was propounded by people who were not to be trusted, or that 
the Constitution contained sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse. As Winkler has pointed 
out: 
Die Furcht vor dem “Parlaments-Absolutismus” hatte einen konkreten sozialen 
Hintergrund: Eine sozialistische Mehrheit in der Volksvertretung lag 1918/19 durchaus 
im Bereich des Vorstellbaren. Von einem Reichspräsidenten, der sein Amt einer 
Volkswahl verdankte, konnte man sich dagegen eine vergleichsweise konservativere 
Politik erhoffen. Es war ebendieser Effekt, der die bürgerliche Mehrheit der 
Nationalversammlung für die direkte Volkswahl des Reichspräsidenten, seine 
siebenjährige Amtszeit und seine umfassenden Befugnisse im – weitgefaßten – 
Notstandsfall votieren ließ.131 
Whether the USPD’s warnings concerning the abuse of the presidential powers or the more 
favorably inclined comments of the MSPD – which nonetheless made reference to the 
possible damage that might be caused by use of the powers – when taken as a whole, the sum 
of the comments and arguments made would seem to indicate that the liberals would not have 
been able to sit in the National Assembly in Weimar and not be made aware of the 
possibilities for the powers granted to the President to cause harm – the notoriously poor 
acoustics in the chamber notwithstanding.  
 





The extent to which the majority view – that the drafters of the Weimar Constitution 
were unaware of where the presidential powers could lead – has become entrenched in the 
literature is suggested by an academic work which, while not focused exclusively on the 
constitutional practices of Weimar Germany, makes reference to them. Writing in the Yale 
Law Review, Lindseth describes the drafters’ work in terms of what seems, by the time of 
publication in 2004, to be the well-established understanding:   
[P]erhaps more famously, Article 48 gave the President an initially overlooked but 
extremely important set of emergency powers that could be invoked in situations 
“[w]here public security and order [were] seriously disturbed or endangered.”132 
The words “initially overlooked” are footnoted to a secondary source by Peter C. Caldwell,133 
who states that Article 48 was viewed “merely as a carryover from the 1871 Imperial 
Constitution and the 1850 Prussian Constitution.”134 But Lindseth further notes that Caldwell 
himself cites secondary sources by Willibalt Apelt135 and Harlow James Heneman.136 Thus 
this view of Article 48 has been transmitted through a series of secondary sources which were 










written well after 1919 and after the collapse of the democratic system in Germany had 
occurred. Scepticism about such transmission underlies the methodology used throughout this 
thesis and its emphasis on the evidence of primary sources when comparing the various views 
in the literature.  
This thesis has argued that the drafters of the Weimar Constitution had some measure of 
authoritarian tendencies in their ideas on government, even if these ideas were not recognised 
by the individuals who held them as necessarily authoritarian in nature. The conception of the 
State held by the liberal drafters and their understanding of the roles the various political 
bodies had to play, namely the Parliament and President, were expressed in the Weimar 
Constitution and there embodied these authoritarian ideas. This conclusion aligns with the 
scholarship exemplified by Hans Mommsen and Ernst Fraenkel. 
This thesis has also argued that it would not have been possible for the same liberal drafters 
to have been unaware of the inherent possibilities of the powers granted to the President to be 
used in a quasi-dictatorial manner, given the extensive and numerous debates which were 
held on just these possibilities within the National Assembly. This conclusion aligns with the 
minority view in the scholarship as exemplified by Albertin, Fraenkel and Winkler. The 
majority view in the field of research is that the individuals and groups who most influenced 
the constitutional drafting process were ignorant of the authoritarian possibilities inherent in 
Article 48 and the powers of the President. This conclusion is sometimes arrived at in the 
absence of substantive evidence being supplied to support the supposition and, in several 
cases, is followed by evidence suggesting the contrary: that the National Assembly as a 
whole and the various committee members as individuals were aware – and if not, were made 
aware by the debates and arguments of others – of where such provisions could lead. To posit 
these possibilities is not to completely discount the possibility that some among them 
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believed the governmental form which they had constructed contained enough checks to 
balance that power: but it certainly contradicts any argument asserting that they were not 
aware of its nascent possibilities. It seems therefore justified to suggest that a more nuanced 
approach is needed within the scholarship in the area, which does not discount the possibility 
out of hand that the drafters of the Constitution were either made aware of, knew but 
considered justified, or intended the authoritarian consequences of the document they had 
created. While it is usually true that, what we look for we tend to find, it is nonetheless able 
to be asserted, with credible evidence from primary source documents, that the drafters did 
intend these consequences to some degree, though whether this was done to facilitate the 
liberal ideal of a charismatic individual leading the nation with a representative body beneath 
him or in an attempt to allow the repression of a future Socialist majority which still seemed 
to threaten in 1919, can only be speculated upon.  
An enquiry into the conceptions of the drafters regarding these elements of the Weimar 
Constitution has relevance, not only for our understanding of their palpable impact on the 
events of the 1920s and 1930s, but also for contemporary conceptions of various 
constitutional forms. The emergence of many new democracies onto the international scene 
following the break-up of the Soviet bloc – and more recently in the Middle East – means 
that it is of more than historical interest to note the successes and failures of the drafters of an 
avowedly democratic Constitution in a country which had only a limited experience of that 
governmental form, and the reasons they made the decisions they did in drafting the 
document. A range of studies has been conducted in recent years – particularly following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union – into the so-called “export potential” of various forms of 
democratic government, be they presidential, parliamentary or a combination of both. One 
particularly interesting finding, given the eventual trajectory of the Weimar Republic’s 
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political life, was that of a seminal study, completed by Adam Przeworski in 2000, which 
concluded that presidential democracies are, “simply more brittle under all economic and 
political conditions.”137 
To draw a wider conclusion, it can be argued that those drafting Constitutions in new 
democratic societies today should not become so concerned with fears for the parliamentary 
majorities which could arise in the future that they create an even bigger hindrance to the 
development and continuation of democratic government by granting overriding power to a 
directly elected presidential authority. It is also interesting to note – given the allusion made 
by Abgeordneter Fischer to the lessons to be learned from the mistakes of the French 
Constitution of 1848 – Hugh Brogan’s statement that the constitutional convention in that 
country at that time was fixated with the same concerns and fears which preoccupied the 
National Assembly in Weimar: 
The committeemen were experienced enough to know that [. . .] the Left [. . .] might 
win a majority. Haunted by the usual memories the committee supposed that its prime 
duty was to make sure that the Assembly could never turn into another Convention      
[. . .]. On the whole, they coalesced as a single device: strengthening the executive.138 
It must be remembered that the manner in which that Constitution had been drafted led in 
only three short years to the coup d’état of the man who had been elected as the first 
President of the Second Republic in 1848 – Louis Napoleon – who ruled as a dictator before 
crowning himself Napoleon III in 1852. The fact that this series of events was mentioned – 
                                                     





however tangentially – during the debates in the Weimar, with no effect upon the minds or 
opinions of the majority of the assembled grandees, only highlights the validity of the 
hackneyed phrase, which is no less valid for its overuse: those who do not learn from history 





















The appendix includes all the Articles of the Weimar Constitution which are quoted or 
referred to in this thesis. The text is taken from the website of the Deutsches Historisches 
Museum at http://www.dhm.de/lemo/html/weimar/verfassung/index.html. In that text, 
paragraphs within Articles are not numbered.  
Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches 
Das deutsche Volk, einig in seinen Stämmen und von dem Willen beseelt, sein Reich in 
Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit zu erneuern und zu festigen, dem inneren und dem äußeren 
Frieden zu dienen und den gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt zu fördern, hat sich diese Verfassung 
gegeben.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 23 
Der Reichstag wird auf vier Jahre gewählt. Spätestens am sechzigsten Tage nach ihrem [sic] 
Ablauf muß die Neuwahl stattfinden.  
Der Reichstag tritt zum ersten Male spätestens am dreißigsten Tage nach der Wahl 
zusammen.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 25 
Der Reichspräsident kann den Reichstag auflösen, jedoch nur einmal aus dem gleichen 
Anlaß. 
Die Neuwahl findet spätestens am sechzigsten Tage nach der Auflösung statt.  





Das Amt des Reichspräsidenten dauert sieben Jahre. Wiederwahl ist zulässig. 
Vor Ablauf der Frist kann der Reichspräsident auf Antrag des Reichstags durch 
Volksabstimmung abgesetzt werden. Der Beschluß des Reichstags erfordert 
Zweidrittelmehrheit. Durch den Beschluß ist der Reichspräsident an der ferneren Ausübung 
des Amtes verhindert. Die Ablehnung der Absetzung durch die Volksabstimmung gilt als 
neue Wahl und hat die Auflösung des Reichstags zur Folge. 
Der Reichspräsident kann ohne Zustimmung des Reichstags nicht strafrechtlich verfolgt 
werden.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 48 
Wenn ein Land die ihm nach der Reichsverfassung oder den Reichsgesetzen obliegenden 
Pflichten nicht erfüllt, kann der Reichspräsident es dazu mit Hilfe der bewaffneten Macht 
anhalten. 
Der Reichspräsident kann, wenn im Deutschen Reiche die öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung erheblich gestört oder gefährdet wird, die zur Wiederherstellung der öffentlichen 
Sicherheit und Ordnung nötigen Maßnahmen treffen, erforderlichenfalls mit Hilfe der 
bewaffneten Macht einschreiten. Zu diesem Zwecke darf er vorübergehend die in den 
Artikeln 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 und 153 festgesetzten Grundrechte ganz oder zum Teil 
außer Kraft setzen. 
Von allen gemäß Abs. 1 oder Abs. 2 dieses Artikels getroffenen Maßnahmen hat der 
Reichspräsident unverzüglich dem Reichstag Kenntnis zu geben. Die Maßnahmen sind auf 
Verlangen des Reichstags außer Kraft zu setzen. 
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Bei Gefahr im Verzuge kann die Landesregierung für ihr Gebiet einstweilige Maßnahmen der 
in Abs. 2 bezeichneten Art treffen. Die Maßnahmen sind auf Verlangen des 
Reichspräsidenten oder des Reichstags außer Kraft zu setzen. 
Das Nähere bestimmt ein Reichsgesetz.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 50 
Alle Anordnungen und Verfügungen des Reichspräsidenten, auch solche auf dem Gebiete der 
Wehrmacht, bedürfen zu ihrer Gültigkeit der Gegenzeichnung durch den Reichskanzler oder 
den zuständigen Reichsminister. Durch die Gegenzeichnung wird die Verantwortung 
übernommen.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 53 
Der Reichskanzler und auf seinen Vorschlag die Reichsminister werden vom 
Reichspräsidenten ernannt und entlassen.  
Artikel 54 
Der Reichskanzler und die Reichsminister bedürfen zu ihrer Amtsführung des Vertrauens des 
Reichstags. Jeder von ihnen muß zurücktreten, wenn ihm der Reichstag durch ausdrücklichen 
Beschluß sein Vertrauen entzieht.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 114 
Die Freiheit der Person ist unverletzlich. Eine Beeinträchtigung oder Entziehung der 
persönlichen Freiheit durch die öffentliche Gewalt ist nur auf Grund von Gesetzen zulässig. 
Personen, denen die Freiheit entzogen wird, sind spätestens am darauffolgenden Tage in 
Kenntnis zu setzen, von welcher Behörde und aus welchen Gründen die Entziehung der 
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Freiheit angeordnet worden ist; unverzüglich soll ihnen Gelegenheit gegeben werden, 
Einwendungen gegen ihre Freiheitsentziehung vorzubringen.  
Artikel 115 
Die Wohnung jedes Deutschen ist für ihn eine Freistätte und unverletzlich. Ausnahmen sind 
nur auf Grund von Gesetzen zulässig.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 117 
Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post-, Telegraphen- und Fernsprechgeheimnis sind 
unverletzlich. Ausnahmen können nur durch Reichsgesetz zugelassen werden.  
Artikel 118 
Jeder Deutsche hat das Recht, innerhalb der Schranken der allgemeinen Gesetze seine 
Meinung durch Wort, Schrift, Druck, Bild oder in sonstiger Weise frei zu äußern. An diesem 
Rechte darf ihn kein Arbeits- oder Anstellungsverhältnis hindern, und niemand darf ihn 
benachteiligen, wenn er von diesem Rechte Gebrauch macht. 
Eine Zensur findet nicht statt, doch können für Lichtspiele durch Gesetz abweichende 
Bestimmungen getroffen werden. Auch sind zur Bekämpfung der Schund- und 
Schmutzliteratur sowie zum Schutze der Jugend bei öffentlichen Schaustellungen und 
Darbietungen gesetzliche Maßnahmen zulässig.  
[. . .] 
Artikel 123 
Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, sich ohne Anmeldung oder besondere Erlaubnis friedlich 
und unbewaffnet zu versammeln. 
Versammlungen unter freiem Himmel können durch Reichsgesetz anmeldepflichtig gemacht 





Alle Deutschen haben das Recht, zu Zwecken, die den Strafgesetzen nicht zuwiderlaufen, 
Vereine oder Gesellschaften zu bilden. Dies [sic] Recht kann nicht durch 
Vorbeugungsmaßregeln beschränkt werden. Für religiöse Vereine und Gesellschaften gelten 
dieselben Bestimmungen. 
Der Erwerb der Rechtsfähigkeit steht jedem Verein gemäß den Vorschriften des bürgerlichen 
Rechts frei. Er darf einem Vereine nicht aus dem Grunde versagt werden, daß er einen 
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